Before the credit crisis, financial guarantors had a very large footprint in municipal finance. More than half of the municipal bonds issued between 1995 and 2009 were sold with insurance. During the credit crisis, as perceptions of credit quality at the guarantors fell, yields on insured bonds actually rose in excess of yields on equivalent uninsured issues. It does not appear that municipal mutual funds were dumping insured bonds; analysis of holdings data indicates that municipal mutual funds' propensity to sell bonds was unusually low for the issues insured by troubled insurers. The rapid liquidation of Tender Option Bond (TOB) programs do not appear to explain the phenomenon either. Although prior to the credit crisis, insured bonds had been much more liquid than uninsured, during the crisis this relationship reversed.
Financial guarantors sell guarantees to pay principal and interest on underlying bonds in the event that the original issuers are unable to pay. These insurance providers, often called 'bond insurers' or 'monoline insurers', enjoyed a large footprint in municipal finance during the period leading up to the credit crisis. An investor in a bond that has been 'wrapped' with financial guaranty insurance will only experience loss in the joint event of default by both the issuer and the insurer.
Bond insurance augments the credit quality of the issuer with the credit quality of the insurer. In frictionless markets bond insurance should at a minimum be viewed by investors a weakly positive feature. This relationship should hold regardless of the credit quality of the insurer, although the value of the insurance will reflect both the credit quality of the insurer and the issuer of the underlying instrument.
This relationship broke down during the credit crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] . Yields on insured municipal bonds for the first time began to surpass yields on equivalent underlying (unenhanced) bonds that did not have bond insurance. This paper uses data on actual municipal bond trades to document this dislocation. For bonds whose underlying (unenhanced) credit quality merits the A rating, insured bonds traded at yields that were 2.8 basis points lower than insured bonds with similar underlying credit quality from 2000 to 2007 . During 2008 , the insured bonds traded at yields that were 14 basis points higher than uninsured equivalents.
One potential explanation would be that mutual funds, in an effort to 'window dress' their portfolios by removing bonds insured by troubled insurers, were dumping insured municipal issues from their portfolios. We investigate this potential explanation using fund holdings data, and find that the opposite is true. When we control for fund and issue characteristics, we find that mutual funds were actually more likely to sell the uninsured bonds than the insured bonds during the crisis.
We also explore the role that the liquidation of Tender Option Bond (TOB) programs had on the phenomenon described in this paper. TOB programs were a market innovation developed to circumvent the tax-induced difficulty of leveraging a portfolio of municipal bonds. In a TOB program, typically a single municipal bond is placed into a trust, which then issues senior and residual receipts. The dissolution of TOB programs in the credit crisis has been rapid and widespread, but we show that these liquidations do not account for the yield inversion phenomenon.
We also show that the credit crisis has seen a reversal of the longstanding relationship between insurance and liquidity. Until 2007 insured bonds were much more liquid than uninsured bonds. From the onset of the credit crisis, the two types of bonds have become equally illiquid, with bonds insured by troubled insurers becoming slightly less liquid than uninsured issues.
As an example of the phenomenon we describe in this paper, consider a comparison of two New York City bonds, one insured by Ambac, the other These apparent dislocations have been a remarkably persistent feature of the credit crisis. Indeed, so far they appear to be something closer to a new equilibrium feature of municipal credit markets than a transient phenomenon, at least while the currently outstanding insured municipal bonds remain outstanding. The persistence of these patterns reflects a number of factors. In particular, municipal bonds are exceptionally difficult to sell short and indeed there is essentially no borrowing market for tax-free municipal bonds. There are millions of individual municipal bonds, many of which only have a small number of holders. At the termination of the short position, an arbitrageur who had shorted an individual municipal bond could find himself unable to obtain, and perhaps unable to even locate, an identical bond, leading to an extremely dire situation.
In addition, a short-seller of a municipal bond would face an extra tax hurdle, related to the tax exemption enjoyed by most municipal debt. While a municipality can pay tax-exempt interest to an investor, if that investor lends shares to a short-seller, the short-seller does not inherit the ability to pay tax-exempt interest to the bond owner who has made his bonds available for borrowing. Thus, in order to compensate the lender for the after-tax value of the coupons foregone on the municipal debt, the arbitrageur will have to pay a higher rate of interest. Potential short-sellers of municipal debt therefore face an additional tax-related wedge above and beyond the transactions cost faced by short-sellers of taxable debt.
In addition, an investor who borrows to establish a position in municipal debt will not enjoy the ability to deduct their interest paid from taxes. The loss of net interest income described above is therefore not offset by benefits due to the interest tax shield of debt.
These frictions have made the dislocation in the municipal bond market between insured and uninsured debt more persistent than other financial dislocations. The patterns are consistent with the model of Vayanos and Wang (2007) , who explore the equilibrium relationship between liquidity and price for securities that offer equivalent payoff streams. If the securities differ in liquidity, investors with higher liquidity demand will concentrate in the more liquid of the two markets, and the price and liquidity of that security will be higher in equilibrium. This is true even if the underlying dividend streams are equivalent, or only minimally different. Applying this insight to the current situation in municipal bond markets, if insurance is viewed as an addition to the dividend stream of an underlying instrument, when the value of the insurance falls low enough, the value of the insured bonds can still be lower in equilibrium if they are illiquid enough.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the structure of the bond insurance industry and the factors behind the deterioration in the perceived value of the insurance provided by a number of particularly troubled insurers.
Section 2 reviews the academic literature on financial guaranty insurance and the municipal debt market. Section 3 describes the empirical hypotheses tested in this paper and the sources of data used. Section 4 focuses on the relationship between insurance and the yields on insured and uninsured municipal debt. Section 5 explores the trading behavior of municipal bond funds during the crisis, finding that the mutual fund sector was not dumping the insured instruments. Section 6 explores the liquidity of insured and uninsured instruments before and during the crisis period. Table 1 shows the share of new issues, both by count and by dollar value, that were issued with financial guaranty insurance attached.
The Financial Guarantors
At the same time, the bond insurers rapidly expanded their business in offering guarantees of structured finance securities directly or indirectly tied to the performance of the housing market (e.g., mortgage-backed collateralized debt obligations). Table 2 shows the aggregate result. By the end of 2006, the industry collectively insured over $800 Billion of structured finance instruments, versus $1.3 Trillion of municipal securities.
Across the major financial guarantors, all to some degree were involved in guaranteeing securities tied to the performance of residential mortgage markets. The industry is small enough that all of the major competitors can fit into one table: Table 3 shows the mix of public finance and structured finance business at each of the major insurers back to 2001. Although all of the major guarantors entered the structured finance market, the collapse of the structured finance market divided the group of incumbents roughly into two: Assured Guaranty and FSA retained their AAA credit ratings and have since merged, while the other guarantors (MBIA, Ambac, CIFG, FGIC, and XL) became troubled and lost their investment grade credit ratings. Table 4 shows the performance of the major guarantors before and during the credit crisis. We maintain throughout our analysis a distinction between the bonds that are insured by the troubled insurers and the bonds that are insured by FSA, Assured Guaranty, and the Berkshire Hathaway-affiliated new entrant in 2008.
Although the expansion into structured finance ex post was expensive for the financial guarantors, there are some reasonable ex ante justifications. Since the underlying diligence in assessing municipal credit risk is similar to (in fact more or less includes) analyzing local housing markets, expanding into structured finance easily leveraged the existing infrastructure for the monoline insurers. One consequence, however, was that as the real estate market and its structured derivatives, particularly those tied to subprime mortgages, collapsed during the Credit Crisis of 2007-2009, the financial guarantors' balance sheets and the industry's solvency became a focus of concern for investors and regulators.
The financial guaranty industry is an interesting complement to the credit rating industry. Both the credit rating industry and the financial guarantors provide some measure of pooling in the production of information about underlying borrowers: the rating agencies investigate borrowers' condition and circumstances in order to construct their ratings, while the financial guarantors performed a similar service before underwriting an issue. Indeed, the financial guaranty industry on its face appears to correct a major deficiency with the existing system of credit ratings: while the ratings agencies were not directly exposed to the performance of the securities that they assigned ratings to, the financial guarantors took on the risk of default for these instruments.
Financial guarantors also provided a service of preventing 'free riding' by bondholders in negotiating with recalcitrant creditors: by concentrating the risk of nonpayment into the financial guarantors' hands, the setup effectively prevented issuers of insured bonds from exploiting the dispersion of bondholders in potentially valueextracting renegotiations. This service is particularly important given the dispersed nature of municipal bond investors: 36 percent of municipal debt is held directly by households, with an additional 36 percent held by mutual funds 15 percent by insurance companies, and 8 percent by banks.
Existing Literature
The financial guaranty industry was a focus of early research by Thakor (1982) , who develops a model where issuers' purchase of bond insurance signals their underlying credit quality. Nanda and Singh (2004) focus on a tax-based explanation for the existence of bond insurance: the insurance allows an indirect tax arbitrage, with the insurer maintaining the tax-exempt status of the interest payments to the investor in the event of issuer default. Denison (2003) empirically explores which issuers elect to issue bonds with bond insurance. Denison finds that lower-rated (BBB) issues are much more likely to be sold with insurance, and that issuers into markets that are 'crowded' with issues from the same state are likely to be sold with insurance. He interprets the results as suggesting that insurance is purchased to make bonds attractive to a wider audience and ameliorate market segmentation. Gore, Sachs, and Trzcinka (2004) investigate the relationship between municipal financial disclosure and bond insurance, comparing the low-disclosure state of Pennsylvania with the high-disclosure state of Michigan. They find that bonds in Pennsylvania are more likely to be sold with bond insurance, consistent with disclosure and bond insurance being substitutes for enhancing the attractiveness of municipal issues. Butler, Fauver, and Mortal (2008) investigate patterns of municipal corruption, and find that higher corruption levels are associated with lower-rated bonds, higher yields, and greater use of bond insurance. While their finding that credit insurance is chosen by lower-quality issuers might be cause for concern, they also find that the corrupt issuers lower credit ratings, suggesting that our control for the credit rating of the underlying issuer is appropriate in our empirical analysis. Both Butler et al (2008) and Gore et al (2004) suggest that bond insurance is used to enhance the attractiveness of municipal debt, counteracting either financial opaqueness or potential corruption on the part of issuers.
Several researchers have focused on the recent turmoil among financial guarantors. Neale and Drake (2009) trace the history of the financial guaranty industry and, using MBIA as a case study, construct a narrative for the industry's current struggles based on exposure to housing-related structured finance instruments.
Martell and Kravchuk (2009) focus on the market for variable-rate municipal bonds, a particular sub-segment of the muni market. They study the effect of the creditworthiness of liquidity providers for the instruments on the reoffering rates of the bonds. Focusing on 58 bonds from July 2008 to May 2009, they find that the creditworthiness of the liquidity provider has a significant impact on the bond spreads, but that the credit quality of the bond insurers for the instrument does not. This result, consistent with the results in our paper, suggests that changes in liquidity of municipal instruments is a vital part of explaining changes in their prices during the crisis.
Gorton (2009) describes a mechanism by which changes in insurer creditworthiness could explain the market valuation of the underlying security.
Numerous investors, particularly regulated and individual retail investors, seek informationally insensitive, highly creditworthy securities -in this case, wrapped municipal bonds, but in general highly-rated instruments. They invest in these securities, but never build up the institutional infrastructure to perform robust credit analysis, or evaluate underlying issuer credit information in the first place. When the creditworthiness of the bond insurers becomes questionable, these investors do not have the capabilities to analyze the individual securities and instead sell the newly questioned securities -here, the wrapped bonds.
Hypotheses and data
We explore three empirical questions. First: what happened to the yields on insured versus 'equivalent' uninsured bonds during the credit crisis. We estimate monthly regressions of bond yields on characteristics, running separate regressions by underlying (unenhanced) credit rating. We find that during the credit crisis the spreads on insured bonds has exceeded spreads on equivalent uninsured bonds, and then turn to investigate what caused this pattern. One hypothesis is that mutual funds, perhaps seeking to 'window dress' the names of troubled insurance companies out of their portfolios (see Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny) dumped the issues insured by troubled insurers out of their portfolios. We investigate this by turning to the portfolio holdings data for municipal-focused mutual funds, which are available starting at the end of 2007. Looking month by month, we find that contrary to our window-dressing hypothesis, these investors in aggregate became more hesitant to sell the insured issues after the credit crisis broke. To some degree, our empirical approach here is a matter of looking where the light is: it would be interesting to observe the trading patterns of other holders, such as insurance companies and hedge funds, as well, but their holdings are not revealed at the same level of disaggregation.
We also explore the liquidation of Tender Option Bond (TOB) programs, programs through investors were able to established leveraged positions in (disproportionately insured) municipal debt. The unwinding of these programs has been identified as a cause of significant dislocations in the municipal bond market. We find, however, that this part of the unwinding of leverage does not appear to be a full explanation for the yield inversion phenomenon: separating trades into trades in bonds that are held by liquidating TOB programs and trades in non-TOB bonds, the non-TOB bonds appear to be driving the yield inversion that we document.
Continuing the focus on liquidity, we investigate patterns in the liquidity of uninsured and insured municipal securities. We find that the insured securities were more liquid until the start of the crisis, when the securities became equally illiquid.
The primary data used in this paper are the trades in the municipal bond market.
Data covering bond characteristics come from Mergent, and include information on call schedules, put schedules, maturity dates, issuance dates, and bond tax status. Table 1 describes the Mergent sample. That sample has 2.37 Million bonds in total, which were issued as part of 243,000 distinct issues. The total face value issued was $7. The data on mutual fund holdings come from the CRSP Mutual funds portfolio holdings database. Table 6 describes this data source. The database has 21,000,000 individual security-portfolio pairs, of which 1,000,000 appear to be municipal securities 
Empirical evidence: yields on insured and uninsured bonds
The first empirical analysis in this paper explores the relationship between insurance and bond yields both before and after the start of the credit crisis. It is important to find a set of bonds that, in the absence of credit insurance, would be homogeneous. We focus on bonds that are rated by Standard and Poor's, and for which S&P provides an equivalent credit rating for the underlying issuer (called a SPUR). This underlying issuer credit rating reflects an 'unenhanced' credit quality of the issuer, and allows us to construct pools of insured and uninsured bonds that have equivalent underlying credit quality.
We start by choosing a relatively homogeneous sample of bonds and trades of those bonds. The restrictions include 1) A restriction to bonds that have S&P credit rating information; 2) The exclusion of bonds that are puttable, callable, or sinkable.
This restriction excludes more than half of our available observations, but allows us to use relatively straightforward measures of bond yield that do not depend on a particular model of interest rate movements; 3) The inclusion only of fixed-coupon bonds. This is also designed to lead to a simple sample of transparent bonds; 4) Restricting the sample to tax-exempt general obligation bonds. We exclude bonds that are taxable, and we exclude bonds that are not general obligation issues. Limiting the sample to GO bonds excludes the numerous bonds that are issued with recourse to the revenues from particular projects, for example highways or stadiums, but that do not have recourse to the issuers' tax revenues; 5) trades data are used, and the trade must be a customer purchase or sale.
These restrictions reduce the size of the sample. For example, in June of 2009 we end up with at total of 23301 trades. Of these trades, 15362 are in instruments where the underlying credit quality is rated AA; 6529 are in instruments with A-rated underlying quality, and 1410 are in instruments with BBB-rated underlying quality. We estimate regressions of bond yield on characteristics separately by month and by underlying credit rating. Equation (1) below represents the specification that we employ: 
The subscript CR reflects the fact that different regressions are run by credit quality (AA,A, and BBB). The subscript t reflects the fact that we run different regressions by month. Standard errors in each regression are clustered at the instrument level. Table 7 Specification (1) includes controls for bond and issue size, as well as maturity and the characteristics of the trade. The specification forces the estimated coefficients on these controls to be the same for the insured and uninsured bonds in the sample, with the loading on the insured bond dummy capturing the impact of insurance. Specification (2) below relaxes the restriction implicit in Specification (1), and allows each of the control coefficients to be estimated separately by insurance status:
, ,
Although in Specification (1) the underlying characteristics of the sample are held relatively constant by running the regressions separately by credit rating, and restricting the sample to fixed-coupon GO debt, the more flexible specification controls for any potential misspecifications that could be induced by forcing bond and trade characteristics to exert the same impact on yield in both insured and uninsured bonds.
The impact of insurance is measured as the marginal impact of the insurance dummy, measured at the sample means of the other control variables. Table 8 and Figures 5, 6 , and 7 show the results with the more flexible specification. For the AA-rated and A-rated underlying issuer samples, the more flexible specification increases the estimated magnitude of the yield inversion phenomenon. For the AA-rated issuers, the average estimated pre-crisis insurance effect is a 6.3 basis point reduction in yields. During the crisis the estimated effect is a 22.9 basis point increase in yields. For the BBB-rated issuers the estimated insurance impact in the crisis period, but the estimated effect of 41.8 basis points is still highly statistically significant. his more flexible equation allows for different effects of insurance on yield by different underlying characteristics of the bond.
Our estimate of the reversal in the yield spread between uninsured and insured bonds based on the empirical specifications (1) and (2), while striking, is smaller in magnitude than the reversal documented in Figure 1 for the two New York City GO bonds from the same bond issue. A possible reason for some attenuation in the estimated magnitude of the yield reversal is that our analysis is based on individual bond trades. In selecting only the bonds that actually trade, we end up selecting a subsample of bonds that are disproportionately liquid. If the more liquid bonds are disproportionately trading at compressed yields, then differences in yields between the insured and uninsured segments may be attenuated. While controlling for the amount if the bond issued, as well as the amount of the entire issue (most municipal debt is issued with multiple bonds in an individual issue) reflects an effort to control for this liquidity effect (larger issues are more liquid), the control may be imperfect. For this reason, the estimates in Table 7 and Within each set of bonds, the mean and median coupons were close to 5 percent, and the mean and median maturities were close to 13 years. Applying a duration of 9.5 years to our coefficient estimates in Table 7 (9.0 basis points for AA, 16.2 basis points for A, and 61.5 basis points for BBB) gives an aggregate estimated underpricing of $9.05 Billion. Of that total, $2.26 Billion is accounted for by the AA-equivalent underlying credit quality bonds, $4.11 by the A (underlying quality) bonds, and $2.68 by the BBB (underlying quality) bonds.
The relative underpricing of the insured bonds is striking along at least two dimensions. First, as described above, the underpricing is large in economic magnitude.
Second, the reversal from the pre-crisis period is striking. The absolute value of the coefficients on the insurance dummies went from being small and negative during the pre-crisis period to large and positive during the crisis. This reversal implies that the negative absolute value of the insurance today currently far exceeds the positive value that the insurance carried before the crisis.
Empirical evidence: mutual fund trades
Given the odd pattern documented in the previous section, with the law of one price appearing not to hold, it is a reasonable conjecture that some class of investors may have been dumping the insured securities. Portfolio managers seeking to avoid questions from investors about exposures to troubled financial guarantors could possibly have been dumping the insured securities in order to avoid uncomfortable conversations that begin with questions like "how much MBIA exposure do you have?" In order to test this hypothesis, at least with respect to a large and important class of institutional investors, we turned to data on mutual fund holdings and trades, described in an earlier section.
These data, for municipal securities, generally begin in December of 2007. For each portfolio-municipal bond-date observation, we construct a variable indicating whether the bond was sold (partially or fully) out from the portfolio between the observation date and the next time that the fund portfolio is observed. The specification we estimate is expressed in Equation (2) below:
, , The subscript f,i,t indicates that the sell variable is constructed for each time period for each bond-fund pair. We estimate the regression separately by month. Table 9 shows the results. The coefficients on insured bonds and troubled-insurer-insured bonds are additive: for example in September of 2008 insurance by a stable insurer reduced the probability of sale of a bond by 1.2 percent, and insurance by a troubled insurer reduced the probability of sale by 1.2 + 3.3 = 4.5 percent. Figure 8 shows the results graphically.
Our hypothesis that mutual funds might be dumping insured instruments during the crisis was not borne out by the data; in fact the funds appeared to have increased their propensity to hold onto insured securities, relative to the uninsured securities.
Empirical evidence: liquidation of Tender Option Bond (TOB) programs
Directly borrowing to finance a portfolio of municipal debt is prevented by the IRS, which will generally not allow investors to deduct interest payments on debt that directly finances a portfolio of tax-exempt bonds. A financial innovation called the 'Tender Option Bond' allows investors to establish a position akin to a leveraged position in tax-exempt debt. The cost is a somewhat more convoluted and highly-engineered structure than would be required to established a levered position in taxable debt.
In a TOB program, an underlying municipal bond (and occasionally a portfolio of a small number of underlying bonds) is placed into a trust. The trust then issues both senior receipts and residual receipts. The senior receipts pay a floating interest rate, are periodically remarketed, and are designed to remain priced at par. The senior receipts, often called floaters, are an eligible investment for money market mutual funds.
Liquidity providers sell commitments to purchase the senior receipts in the event of a failed periodic remarketing. This liquidity option, however, can terminate (called a tender option termination event) in the event of downgrade of the underlying issue in the trust.
With the senior receipts paying floating interest rates and generally priced at par, the residual claim inherits the bulk of the risk of the municipal bond in the trust, and thus offers an exposure similar to a leveraged exposure in the underlying municipal bond.
TOB programs grew to be a significant feature of the municipal bond market. Bloomberg also provides data on the liquidation date of TOB programs; 2008 saw the liquidation of at least USD 70 Billion worth of TOB programs. This rapid deleveraging has been identified as a cause of dislocations in the market for municipal debt. Figure 9 shows monthly creation and liquidation of TOB programs over the same period.
Insured bonds were somewhat more likely to be included in TOB programs than uninsured, since suppliers of the liquidity preferred to include highly rated instruments in the program. Table 11 compares the characteristics of the bonds known to be included in TOB programs with the other bonds in the Mergent sample by the date of issue of the bond (note that Table 10 is divided by the date of creation of the TOB, rather than the date of issue of the underlying bond held in the trust). Sixty-four percent of TOBincluded bonds were insured, versus 48 percent of the remainder. Year-by-year, bonds included in TOB programs had higher credit ratings than the rest, although the comparison for the entire period includes a composition effect that misleadingly suggests that TOB bonds had lower credit ratings. TOB-included bonds were more likely to be revenue bonds, and tended to be issued at a premium or discount. The most striking differences are the greater size and longer maturity of bonds included in TOB programs; they were on average almost 15 times the size of the rest of the bonds and had twice as long maturity.
Since the liquidation of TOB programs was an important feature of the deleveraging of 2008 and 2009, and since the TOB programs disproportionately had insured debt in their trusts, we investigate the role that this liquidation had on the phenomenon described in this paper. For each bond, we identify whether it was in a TOB program, and for each trade in that bond we identify whether than program had been liquidated in the past year. We then run specification (1), but including three dummy variables: a troubled insurer/TOB liquidation dummy; a troubled insured/no-TOB dummy; and a no-insurer/TOB dummy. The omitted category is municipal bonds that are not insured by a troubled insurer and not included in any TOB programs liquidated in the year before the trade.
The yield inversion phenomenon described in this paper appears to be driven by the bonds outside of the TOB programs rather than the bonds that were included in TOB programs. Table 12 shows the results of this exercise; the pre-and post-coefficients on the insurance/no-TOB dummy are very similar to the coefficients on the insurance dummy in Table 7 . With a relatively small number of bonds included in TOB programs, the number of trades in TOB bonds is small enough that the monthly coefficients are estimated imprecisely. For the pre-crisis period, the TOB/insured dummy can only be estimated in 16 of the 96 months, and is not statistically significantly different from zero.
In the post-crisis period, the only underlying credit rating where the TOB/insured dummy is significant is the BBB category, where the average estimated monthly coefficient is 84 basis points, significantly larger than the 62 basis point estimated coefficient on the troubled insurer/no TOB dummy. Nonetheless, in spite of the rapid deleveraging of the TOB programs, and the disproportionate weight of insured bonds in those programs, we are unable to find evidence that the yield inversion phenomenon has been driven by the liquidation of the TOB programs.
Empirical evidence: liquidity
Finding that the mutual funds increased their propensity to hold, rather than sell, the insured securities during the credit crisis suggests some deeper analysis of the liquidity of the insured versus the uninsured instruments. Our approach here is simple and straightforward. In each month, we take the entire sample of municipal bonds that trade at all in that month. For those bonds, we take the total number of trades, and construct a liquidity measure which is just equal to the number of trades divided by the number of bonds. We construct this measure separately by month, and for all bonds, for the uninsured bonds, for the insured bonds, and separately for the bonds that are insured by one of the troubled insurers. Table 13 and Figure 10 show the results of this exercise.
Until the credit crisis, the insured bonds traded much more frequently than the uninsured bonds -often as much as 60 percent more frequently. During the credit crisis this pattern reverses dramatically, with the liquidity of the insured bonds falling much more than the uninsured bonds. Indeed, in many months the uninsured bonds have been more liquid than the insured instruments. This is particularly true for instruments that are insured by the now-troubled set of bond insurers.
Interpretation and conclusions
In frictionless markets insured bonds should not trade at higher yields than equivalent underlying bonds that do not carry insurance. Even when an insurer has very low credit quality, some insurance is better than nothing. This paper has shown three empirical patterns in municipal bond markets before and during the credit crisis. First, the credit crisis has seen a sustained increase in the relative yields on insured bonds.
Indeed, controlling for the credit quality of the underlying issuer, we find that the insurance appears to have had a negative premium during the crisis. This relationship has been remarkably stable -not a temporary phenomenon but rather sustained. While
Butler et al (2008) and Gore et al (2004) show that more questionable municipalities are more likely to issue bonds with credit insurance, we have attempted to control for the credit quality of the underlying issuer using the S&P underlying credit rating. Butler et al (2008) show that these credit ratings respond to their measure of problem municipalities, suggesting that this control is valid.
We also show mutual fund dumping of insured instruments does not appear to have been the driver of the sustained increase in the spreads on insured municipal bonds.
If anything, mutual funds appear to have been more hesitant to sell municipal securitiesparticularly municipal securities issued by troubled insurers -during the credit crisis.
Pushing further in this investigation of liquidity, we should that the credit crisis has seen a reversal of the longstanding relationship between liquidity and insurance -for the first time, the insured securities have become less liquid.
The inability of a class of arbitrageurs to come in and quickly arbitrage the difference in yields between insured and uninsured debt reflects the extremely high level of frictions in shorting individual municipal bonds. As of this writing, the higher yields on insured bonds appear to be something closer to a new equilibrium than a transitory phenomenon, along the lines developed in Vayanos and Wang (2007) . In their model, they show that in a market with two securities paying the same dividend stream, endogenous concentration of liquidity in one security can lead the liquidity-demanding investors to concentrate in that security, leading to more liquidity and higher prices for that security. Extending the model slightly to accommodate the minimal 'dividend stream' of insurance from a troubled bond insurer still suggests that underpricing and illiquidity for otherwise similar securities can be persistent, even in markets where investors are perfectly rational.
As an altermative to the fully-rational liquidity-based explanation of the low prices of insured bonds and the agency-based explanation associated with sales by window-dressers, consider a story based on behavioral biases. Faced with two separate forms of security on an instrument, some investors may tend to make the error of taking a weighted average of the security qualities provided, rather than recognizing that the double security of a bond plus an insurance wrapper is always at least weakly better than the best of either of the two forms of protection individually. While we have no test for this theory, and indeed it might sound implausible, we note its strong resemblance to a robust finding in the psychology literature. Many studies, including work by Kahneman and Tversky (1972) , have documented patterns along the following lines: when people are presented with a description of someone named Pat who sounds likely to be a feminist woman, they assign a higher probability to the statement "Pat is a feminist woman" than to the statement "Pat is a woman." If similar patterns of thinking are used in the analysis of municipal bonds, a behavioral explanation may play a role for the persistent mispricing of insured and uninsured debt. Unlike in markets with lower levels of frictions, the high costs faced by potential arbitrageurs in the municipal bond market can make dislocations, whether driven by rational or irrational factors, remarkably longlasting.
This persistence may have a limit, however, if the bond insurance industry does not recover its former position in the new issue market. The collapse of the bond insurance industry, although understandable given the expansion into housing-based structured products, is ironic given that bond insurance appears, on its face, to be a reasonable solution to a number of underlying problems. In particular, bond insurance corrects a criticism often levied at ratings agencies. Unlike the ratings agencies, the bond insurers put money at risk when they offered insurance. 
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